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A n n e D o n c h i n
Converging Concerns: Feminist Bioethics, Development
Theory, and Human Rights
L ike feminist scholarship generally, feminist bioethics has been contin-ually remaking itself as new issues emerge and conceptual shortcom-ings surface. This article has sprung from my growing realization of
a limitation in feminist bioethics, which was prompted by the chance
remark of a newcomer to the field, who, at a recent conference of the
Feminist Bioethics Network, expressed her surprise that so few speakers
had mentioned the human rights movement. Initially puzzled, I reflected
on the network’s mission statement, particularly its emphasis on the de-
velopment of a more inclusive theory of bioethics encompassing the stand-
points and experiences of women and other marginalized social groups,
on the examination of the dominant bioethical discourse that privileges
those already empowered, and on the creation of new methodologies and
strategies that are responsive to the disparate conditions of women’s lives
across the globe.1
Given these long-term goals it now struck me that the range of feminist
bioethics scholarship had been too constricted. My colleagues and I had
yielded to the feminist trend to turn away from global thinking to em-
phasize local and contextual knowledges.2 Consequently, like much other
feminist scholarship, our discourse had become more local as the world
grew closer together (Benhabib 1995). In attempting to globalize feminist
I wish to express my gratitude to colleagues in the International Network on Feminist
Approaches to Bioethics and the editors of this Signs issue who have contributed to my
exploration of the problems I examine in this article.
1 See the mission statement of the International Network on Feminist Approaches to
Bioethics (FAB) at http://www.fabnet.org. The network currently has approximately 350
individual members in twenty-eight countries, publishes a semiannual newsletter, and or-
ganizes a biennial conference. Scholarship by its members has appeared in two anthologies
(Donchin and Purdy 1999; Tong 2001). A third focusing on issues addressed in this article
is scheduled to appear in 2004.
2 Notable exceptions include Florencia Luna (2001) and Jeanelle de Gruchy and Lauriel
Baldwin-Ragavin (2001), who have already begun to explore specific interconnections be-
tween feminist bioethics and human rights.
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bioethics and advance health and well-being across diverse cultures and
traditions, we had added a miscellany of diverse voices and given too little
attention to major structural injustices that often override local bound-
aries. Subsequent conversations with colleagues in overlapping fields led
me to two arenas of discourse and activism that address the intersection
of global concerns and feminist bioethics: human rights and development
theories. But critical exploration of the human rights movement would
compel me to reconsider my own reservations about rights discourse. And
forays into development theory would require rethinking my own, pre-
dominantly visceral, reactions to the dominant development paradigm.
This article incorporates these reflections in the hope of developing a more
coherent and integrated global framework for feminist bioethics. In order
to strengthen connections among these overlapping arenas, I probe in-
terconnections that might overcome the compartmentalization and bi-
furcations that impede collaboration among feminists who share a com-
mon commitment to global change. I hope to show how such linkages
could enrich all three frameworks, thereby contributing to a truly global
feminist program that links theory and practice in ways likely to enhance
women’s health and well-being across diverse cultures. Though my at-
tention will be directed primarily to extending the feminist bioethics
agenda, converging connections will, hopefully, encourage partnerships
among feminists in all three fields.
In matters of health and well-being, all three groups already share
commonalities. They recognize that health does not depend on behavioral
choices alone but is the result of interlocking status determinants that
affect people’s capacities to realize tenable life goals. They also understand
the need to shift the attention of providers and policy makers from an
overemphasis on the delivery of health care services to a greater investment
in preventive programs. And they are acutely aware of conditions that
impair women’s health and diminish their agency, particularly the health
care needs of marginalized groups and those subject to abuse and neglect
and the impact on health of abusive practices such as domestic violence,
discrimination against female children, and demands for husbands’ au-
thorization of their wives’ medical care. All also understand the impact
of local, national, and international power hierarchies on the distribution
of health care resources. Rather than merely deploring existing injustices,
they call for programs of social change to rectify inequities, to empower
marginalized people to define their own health care needs, and to con-
figure local programs to meet those needs (Cook 1999; Holmes 1999;
Nicholas 1999).
Building on these commonalities, I initially consider major critiques of
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rights-based theories, leading responses to them, and recent initiatives
within the international bioethics community intended to reclaim human
rights. Next, I shift to efforts within the human rights movement to
advance global health and consider impediments generated by the dom-
inant economic development paradigm. I then take up an alternative par-
adigm that seeks to forge a global ethic conjoining development and
human rights theories. I evaluate an influential version of this approach
and indicate respects in which it is flawed, noting particularly its failure
to make adequate provisions for group relations that frame the context
of individual lives. Finally, I propose an alternative framework for a global
feminist bioethic that is more fully responsive to practices that would
strengthen all people’s capacities to enjoy healthy, productive lives.
Rights speech: Reservations, rebuttals, and revisions
Feminist resistance to a conceptual apparatus that stresses rights language
has sprung from both sources external to feminism and tendencies within
it. Prominent among the first group is the negative-positive rights polarity
rooted in the liberal tradition. Feminist theorists often point out that a
claim to a negative right obligating others to abstain from interference
has little value without access to resources enabling its exercise. Take the
right to noninterference: it is vacuous without authoritative implemen-
tation (consider access to abortion facilities or enforcement of prohibitions
against rape). Even the right to self-determination requires considerable
social cooperation. For it cannot be exercised even minimally without the
mutual recognition of people’s interdependence. Optimally, it requires
mastery of appropriate cognitive and emotional skills, opportunities to
shape one’s identity in nonoppressive ways, and social support to achieve
personal agency.
An overlapping concern is the tendency of rights-based theories to lapse
into a rigid individualism that disregards the basic human needs of socially
excluded groups. Developing this thread, feminists from a variety of
traditions have spoken out about an overemphasis on individual rights,
how it lends itself to an impoverished sense of personal and social values,
and how it neglects other moral aims that are not expressible as matters
of individual preference—relational ties, sexual equality, and a nurturing
stable child-rearing environment. Some stress affinities between the appeal
to rights and masculinist ideologies of personal control and domination
and chide those who emphasize rights discourse for neglecting relational
values tied to care and interpersonal connection. In a related vein others
fault the conception of personal autonomy associated with rights discourse
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for its mentalistic assumptions that valorize a distinctively masculine ideal
of autonomy that diminishes the importance of embodied particulars and
relegates women to a natural sphere disjoined from human reason (Lov-
ibond 1989, 10).
Diana Tietjens Meyers makes a related point, noting that appeals to
rights are often made when there is a breakdown in loving and caring
relationships—when people’s interests are neglected. She sees the morality
of rights primarily as a morality of self-defense used to protect people
from assaults on their personal integrity. Invoking a right introduces a
generalized perspective that captures one dimension of morality but does
not tell us how to respect people individually (Meyers 1994, 155). I will
revisit this perspective later within the context of relationships between
human rights discourse and development theory.
A further factor in feminist distrust of broad appeals to rights stems
from the early history of the international human rights movement, when
women’s concerns were relegated to the periphery. Despite the 1948 UN
Charter’s inclusion of a right to the highest attainable standard of health,
linkages between health and human rights did not become a focal concern
until the 1980s. The initial formulation addressed only civil and political
rights. In response to pressures to formulate more concrete and potentially
enforceable rights, in 1966 the UN General Assembly adopted a covenant
incorporating social, cultural, and economic rights (known as second-
generation rights). But even this extension did not expressly address equal
protections for women and other marginalized groups.
Other sources of resistance to rights discourse stem from tendencies
within feminist theory. Over the past two decades feminists have turned
away from global thinking to emphasize local and contextual knowledges.
Under Carol Gilligan’s (1982) influence many have stressed patterns of
reasoning allegedly characteristic of women—those based on caring, re-
lationships, and responsibilities—and contrasted them to masculine modes
of reasoning that privilege justice and rights. Though Gilligan did not
regard either as superior, some of her followers, most notably Nel Nod-
dings (1984), did. Noddings believed feminists could dispense with moral
principles, including those that use the (masculine) language of justice
and rights. Adequate moral guidance could be gleaned from individual
cases where people exercise caring duties.
Despite feminist theoretical resistance to the use of rights language,
rights talk has been integral to activist feminist strategies for decades.
Within feminist bioethics, particularly, there has been broad support for
women’s right to reproductive services and the rights of patients to take
control of their own medical decisions. However, feminist bioethicists have
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been reticent to extend rights language to a broader set of practices. Why
so? This reticence can be explained, in part, by international criticism of
U.S. bioethicists for their supposed obsession with rights language. What
is seldom well understood by critics, however, is that appeals to rights are
often rooted in specific features of the U.S. experience that arose at a time
of major change in the expression of ethical principles and that marked a
significant power shift from physician paternalism to patient autonomy.
The articulation of these principles is historically linked to other rights-
based initiatives in the United States, particularly the civil rights movement
and the struggles for women’s rights in the 1960s and 1970s. Both move-
ments brought to public awareness submerged voices and injustices in-
flicted on those lacking access to power.
Turning now to rebuttals to these critiques of rights talk, I will consider
grounds for broader inclusion of rights language in feminist bioethics.
One approach focuses on deficiencies in the theoretical turn exemplified
by Noddings (1984), especially on its virtually exclusive emphasis on in-
terpersonal relationships and its disregard for the political dimensions of
social connection. Martha Minow addresses the difficulty of holding to-
gether a vision encompassing both the personal and political. Responding
to injustices suffered by marginalized groups, she has framed what she
calls “the dilemma of difference”: ignoring group differences undermines
efforts to mobilize opposition to group discrimination, but emphasizing
differences risks entrenching the dominant group’s stereotypes about the
discriminated (1990, 20).3 She attributes the dilemma to social institutions
that establish only one norm, thereby ignoring the perspectives of those
who fall outside that norm (94–95). An exclusively case-oriented per-
spective, such as Noddings advocates, would obscure these effects of social
institutions.
Others have pointed out that rights talk cannot be expunged from a
language that preserves concepts bound up with duty and obligation.4
While resisting propensities to totalize rights language, they emphasize
its central functions. “For the historically disempowered,” Patricia Wil-
liams remarks, “the conferring of rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects
of their humanity” (1991, 152). Williams stresses the need to assess the
value of rights not only from the privileged position of those who have
always had them but also from the position of those to whom they have
been denied. For U.S. blacks, particularly, “the attainment of rights sig-
nifies the respectful behavior, the collective responsibility, properly owed
3 Others have constructed variants of this dilemma. See, e.g., O’Neill 1993, 307.
4 For more on this point see Minow 1990 and Tong 2004.
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by a society to one of its own” (1991, 163). Rights talk, when uttered
by people with the protected standing of bearers of rights, is a socially
empowered form of speech. Lacking it, Margaret Walker notes, people
may voice preferences or complaints but cannot articulate demands that
others are required to meet (2003, 175).
Concurrently, the human rights movement has extended its scope be-
yond the two categories of rights formerly identified and has turned to
the explicit recognition of women’s rights, the rights of peoples (as distinct
from states), and the right to development. The Convention on the Elim-
ination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) stresses
basic education, career, vocational, health, and family planning informa-
tion. It also incorporates mechanisms for monitoring injustices, including
inequitable access to health care services (British Medical Association
2001, 333). Signatory governments, if found deficient, are obligated to
respond. Walker (2003, 171–72) notes that many provisions of CEDAW
grew out of the women’s movements and come much closer than any prior
document to reflecting the lives of women who have been systematically
silenced and to addressing those oppressions that are based on group mem-
bership. Michael Ignatieff, reviewing the past five decades of the human
rights movement (2001c, 169), acclaims its transformed agenda, which
emphasizes social protections against threats to human well-being, the em-
powerment of victims, and the validation of their entitlements to freedom.
Feminist bioethicists could considerably advance the project of glob-
alizing bioethics by reassessing reservations about the adoption of a more
inclusive rights discourse and by giving greater heed to the aims of CE-
DAW. Available evidence shows a high correlation between gender op-
pression and preventable illnesses, particularly in countries with a strong
preference for boy children (Dre`ze and Sen 1989). However, to address
these issues adequately we need a conceptual apparatus that transcends
dichotomies between developed and less-developed countries, incorpo-
rates a compatible development ethic, and integrates relevant features of
the global human rights movement into feminist discourse. Medical
groups in a few countries outside North America have already broken
ground at a practical level.
Some medical organizations are coming to realize that physicians play
a significant role in both the concealment and exposure of human rights
violations. Since physicians are often the first beyond law enforcement
officers to see evidence of the systematic violation of human rights, they
have a heightened responsibility to protect the rights of those in their
charge, and they deserve protection for reporting abuses. The Handbook
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published by the British Medical Association (2001) offers a rich source
for exploring the extensive overlap and interconnections between the con-
ceptual frameworks of bioethics and human rights and their practical ap-
plications. Most important, it facilitates understanding of the ways in
which bioethics and human rights provide complementary approaches to
improving the health of vulnerable populations, particularly within poorer
countries; advancing their well-being; pressing for equitable access to
treatment; protecting women’s health and reproductive rights; developing
nondiscriminatory HIV/AIDS policies; and encouraging practitioners to
act as agents and advocates for social justice.
Issues overlapping bioethics and human rights include the health care
of vulnerable groups, dilemmas about how to respect cultural diversity
without jeopardizing the rights of individuals and groups, securing mean-
ingful informed consent to research (particularly where drug companies
in advanced industrialized countries exploit people in less-developed ones
to research drugs for the market), discrimination in the delivery of health
care services, and connections between such underlying determinants of
health as nutrition and sanitation. Poor nutrition associated with poverty
aggravates the health problems of pregnant and lactating women and
increases their vulnerability to poverty-related diseases.5 Food contami-
nation, infant dehydration, and other life-threatening conditions are re-
sponsible for many infant and child deaths (Mata 1988). Rebecca Cook
observes that “promotion of women’s health depends on the interaction
of most, if not all, human rights” (1999, 260). She specifically mentions
the protection of women’s employment and equal pay for work of equal
value, education, information, political participation, influence, and dem-
ocratic power within legislatures.
To recapitulate, though feminist reservations about rights language are
often directed more to misleading theoretical expositions of rights than
to activist strategies, they have practical consequences too. Theories that
make inadequate provision for rights risk obstructing the advancement of
subordinated groups. But moral theories that give centrality to individual
rights can provide only a partial moral vision. For rights-based moral
thought alone can tell us nothing about what should be done in the
absence of claimant procedures. What is needed is a moral framework that
encompasses rights claims within a broad range of moral norms, a frame-
work that is fully responsive to conditions that shape human health and
5 For a fuller discussion of associations between health and poverty, see Jaggar 2003,
198–203, and the sources cited there.
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well-being across the globe. However, efforts to shape such a framework
need to be responsive to the resistance to a global bioethic that encom-
passes human rights. I turn now to the principal sites of resistance.
Global health and the dominant development paradigm
Of course, criticisms of rights language extend well beyond feminist con-
texts to moral thought in general as well as to central claims of the human
rights movement. Despite successive reformulations of human rights, some
bioethicists still think human rights language is too closely tied to Euro-
American bioethics to contribute meaningfully to a global bioethic. Ac-
cording to Ruth Macklin, opposition to human rights is widespread among
Chinese scholars (1999, 228–33). Other Asian scholars advocate a very
particularized global approach that counters claims to universal human
rights. Defenders of this view assert two related claims. First, in many
countries in East and Southeast Asia, people have no theoretical back-
ground for the concept of human rights. Second, these people seek pri-
marily to overcome starvation and poverty by increasing national wealth
and mutual aid (Sakamoto 1999). Arleen Salles and her collaborators
report similar arguments rejecting human rights claims among some Latin
American scholars (2002).
Several considerations need to be taken into account to evaluate the
responses. Regarding the second objection, it is often not commodity
scarcity that causes famine, injustice, and other factors that contribute to
ill health but socially produced deprivations such as the lack of legal and
other entitlements to food and income (Sen 1990). Among these missing
entitlements is appropriate maternal education to enable mothers to avoid
food contamination, infant dehydration, and other life-threatening con-
ditions that are responsible for so many infant and child deaths (Freedman
1999). I will turn to a more detailed discussion of this issue in the next
section, where I argue that bolstering economic assistance to poorer coun-
tries is not incompatible with human rights advocacy. Denial of a human
rights tradition in Asia is also highly questionable. Amartya Sen has un-
earthed evidence dating human rights advocacy within the Indian tradition
to the twelfth century (2000). And Salles points out that the independence
movements of several Latin American countries based their demands on
claims to natural rights, the antecedent of human rights (2002).
Though the modern formulation is undoubtedly Western in origin, as
Sen’s evidence illustrates, moral discourse that emphasizes rights is a de-
scendant of older concerns about obligation and justice, virtue and hap-
piness, that have been ubiquitous in ethical discussion since antiquity. Not
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until the seventeenth century, though, were the legal dimensions of this
discourse extended to the situation of women and other disenfranchised
groups. The agendas of the social movements that culminated in the
French and American revolutions provided the context for a conceptual
shift to human rights discourse as well as a family of interrelated concepts
that have been central to moral discourse ever since. Though these move-
ments fell far short of their ideals, their stress on the universality of rights
laid the groundwork for contemporary rights claims. The struggles for
voting rights, for full participation in the workforce, and for equal op-
portunity for minority populations are all descendants of these movements
and are grounded in a conception of a common humanity based on shared
human needs.
Seen in this light the unqualified rejection of human rights discourse
that marks some non-Western approaches to bioethics seems directed
more to those who already have control over the basic conditions of their
lives than to those living on the margins who lack the economic security
and reliable social support that the more privileged take for granted. How-
ever, as I noted previously, the value of rights needs to be assessed not
only from the privileged position of those who already have them but
also from the position of those to whom they have been denied. Once
human rights are understood as the moral rights of all people in all sit-
uations, the central issue is transformed from whether human rights claims
should be included within moral discourse to how to identify and char-
acterize them.6
The application of this criterion provides a yardstick for evaluating models
of economic development directed to improving living conditions in de-
veloping economies. In the next section, I will examine in detail the human
capabilities model advanced by Sen and Martha Nussbaum, but first I will
take up the model that has dominated international assistance programs in
developing economies. Based on a quasi-utilitarian model of preferences
that prioritizes economic values, it takes a country’s gross domestic product
to be the measure of the quality of life of its inhabitants and assumes that
people’s expressed preferences represent their actual needs and wants. In-
stitutions that direct globalization support this paradigm. Control of these
institutions intensifies the West’s economic dominance through programs
of national-multilateral “security” that exacerbate the marginalization of
populations that cannot contribute significantly to wealth expansion. Alison
Jaggar (2003) documents how economic globalization contributes to
6 This is the characterization of human rights preferred by both Williams (1991) and
Macklin (1999), esp. 225–28.
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growing disparities in health outcomes for women worldwide. She, among
others, has taken the International Monetary Fund to task for champi-
oning market supremacy and insisting on repayment of wealthy creditors
even when reimbursement impoverishes the domestic economy of the
debtor nations and intensifies their poverty, because forcing debtor coun-
tries to repay loans regardless of the condition of their economy severely
diminishes the resources available to support the health and well-being
of their people. For example, the intellectual property rules that require
poor nations to honor drug patents will result in a transfer of $40 billion
a year from poor countries to corporations in the developed world (Ro-
senberg 2002). Other stratagems employed by Western economic interests
include co-optation of rights language to distort and threaten alliances
between Western women and those in developing economies. Some fem-
inists fault these interests for using the cloak of reproductive rights to
hijack the agenda of population control programs by manipulating
women’s reproductive capacity to achieve the demographic goals set by
dominant elites (Freedman 1999, 234).
However, in some of these countries feminists have begun to seize the
initiative, restoring the vitality of rights discourse and opposing the treat-
ment of women as “targets” of contraceptive programs. Women from
Asia, Africa, and Latin America have played leading roles in defining the
terms and setting the direction of women’s human rights movements (as
well as reproductive health and rights movements) both in their own
countries and at the international level. Several groups are now seeking
to counteract programs that would narrow the human rights agenda to
the advantage of the West. In a recent address to the World Bank, Mary
Robinson, the United Nations high commissioner for human rights, sum-
marized recent efforts within the United Nations system to channel eco-
nomic growth resulting from globalization to eradicate poverty, inequality,
and deprivation. She called for “ethical globalization” that would make
the full complement of rights articulated in the international human rights
standards available to all (2001).
Human rights and capabilities models of human development
Economist Amartya Sen, joined by a number of development scholars,
has questioned the economic development model on two interrelated
grounds. First, as I pointed out earlier, famine, injustice, and other factors
that contribute to ill health are due primarily not to commodity scarcity
so much as to socially produced deprivations, including lack of entitle-
ments to food and income. Second, the desires and preferences expressed
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by people who live under oppressive conditions may not provide an ad-
equate guide to their actual needs for either survival or flourishing. Sen
(1985) cites health surveys in India that document disparities between
women’s self-reports about their health and their actual health status. The
weight of patriarchal social structures and the ancestral history of women’s
subjection may distort their consciousness, so they internalize prevailing
social norms and fail to recognize their own actual needs. In such instances,
Sen insists, their preferences are deformed.
Based on these criticisms Sen has developed a comprehensive economic
strategy for encompassing development goals within a more inclusive the-
oretical framework that takes into account aspects of all three generations
of human rights ratified by UN member states: civil and political rights;
social, cultural, and economic rights; and rights that protect marginalized
social groups. The approach to human development that he has pioneered
is known as the capabilities approach because, instead of taking gross
domestic product as the measure of wealth, it weighs people’s capability
to lead lives of their own choosing.
In 1986, Nussbaum and others joined Sen in a collaborative UN-
sponsored project to incorporate interdisciplinary perspectives into de-
velopment projects. In a succession of works (1992, 1998, 1999, 2000),
Nussbaum has sought to provide philosophical grounding for a specific
version of the capabilities approach. She distinguishes her model from
Sen’s by its explicit disavowal of relativism, its conception of human func-
tioning derived from Marx and Aristotle, and its enumeration of specific
central capabilities.7 Following John Rawls’s thought experiment (1971),
she imagines a hypothetical group of people deprived of all knowledge
about their social position, natural assets, and specific conception of the
good life. They assemble to specify fair terms of cooperation for regulating
the basic structures of society. She reasons that they would aim at equality
of capability rather than equality of resources, since the latter would be
more likely to lead to unequal outcomes that could affect them adversely;
some people—for example, disabled people or those who need more food
because they perform hard physical labor—might need more resources
than others to achieve a comparable quality of life (Nussbaum 1992). She
then enumerates ten functional capabilities, including bodily health, ad-
equate nourishment, and shelter, that people require to freely choose lives
they personally value (2000, 78–80).8 Understood in this way, the ca-
7 For a more detailed discussion of her differences with Sen, see Nussbaum 2000, 11–15.
8 Nussbaum has continually revised her formulation of the functional capabilities. I sum-
marize only her most recent version.
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pabilities approach has profound implications for development strategies
aimed at implementing health-related rights.
Nussbaum, like an increasing number of other scholars and develop-
ment organizations (e.g., World Bank 2001), has recently turned her
attention to the broad economic and social implications of gender dis-
crimination in developing and transitional countries. Nussbaum’s concern,
however, is also directed to the influence of patriarchal religious com-
munities on women’s ability to enjoy healthy, satisfying lives. A recent
remark by Ignatieff, reputedly an ardent supporter of human rights, aptly
illustrates the kind of insensitivity to gender hierarchies that creeps into
Western scholars’ attempts to avoid criticism of other cultures’ religious
practices. In the course of a discussion urging equal political representation
of the interests of the powerless, he asserts: “If, for example, religious
groups determine that women should occupy a subordinate place within
the rituals of the group, and this place is accepted by the women in
question, there is no warrant to intervene on the grounds that human
rights considerations of equality have been violated” (2001b, 19).
Unlike Ignatieff, Nussbaum is not averse to taking on the naturalizing
hierarchies of power and privilege that persist in many religious com-
munities and contribute to the continuing impoverishment of women.
She also recognizes connections between these hierarchies and privatized
family structures that exploit women’s labor only as a means to collective
family well-being. Her sensitivity to these issues leads her to focus on the
embodied individual as the basic unit for political thought. She develops
a rationale for distributing resources in ways that attend to the well-being
of all individuals whatever their capabilities and wherever they fall in the
life span. This approach has the advantage of addressing specific devel-
opment goals within a more encompassing global context than the leading
development paradigms. In this respect her model, like Sen’s, is compatible
with features of third-generation human rights that attempt to specify
human rights more concretely than earlier conceptualizations.
Nussbaum recognizes the dominance of rights language in the inter-
national development world and acknowledges a very close relationship
between capabilities and rights, but she prefers to take capabilities as her
starting point (2000, 97–101). She believes that rights language often
obscures difficult questions and can create the illusion of agreement where
there is actually deep philosophical disagreement. Examples she cites in-
clude differences about the basis of rights claims, relationships between
rights and duties, whether rights belong to individuals or groups, and
what the rights holder has a right to. She prefers to think of both first-
generation (liberty) rights and second-generation (welfare) rights as com-
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bined capabilities that provide a benchmark for thinking about what it
means to secure someone’s right. However, she does not wish to do away
with rights language altogether. She enumerates several important roles
that it plays in public discourse: reminding those in power that people
have certain justified claims whether or not anyone has done anything
about them, emphasizing people’s choice and autonomy where rights are
guaranteed by the state, and preserving a sense of a terrain of agreement.
Her comments suggest the possibility of interweaving both the capabilities
model of development ethics and rights discourse within a common plu-
ralistic framework. Before addressing this point, however, I would like to
consider some limitations in her theoretical framework that cry out for
more comprehensive strategies. I will focus first on the most serious—a
disregard of individuals’ connection to a nexus of group relationships that
shape their identities and regulate their social positioning. Then I will
briefly mention several others.
Integrating group identifications into a development paradigm
Nussbaum’s account of capabilities recognizes only two levels of identi-
fication: the universal and the individual. Within her scheme the individual
is the basic unit for political thought. She understands the central capa-
bilities I have enumerated as universal norms of human functioning. To
protect the universality of her account and save it from charges of rela-
tivism, she deliberately excludes social groups from her structural frame-
work. Feminist accounts, she is convinced, have a tendency to slide into
relativism by employing “collectivist means to individual ends” (1999,
67). She apparently believes that the only way to avoid this snare is to
base moral claims on universal human capabilities rather than social en-
dowments or relations (1999, 72). To her conviction that individuals have
an essential core of moral personhood, she recognizes only one alternative,
“communitarian anti-essentialism.”9
But feminists who call her formulation into question are not, by and
large, either Marxist “collectivists” or liberals (in the classical sense defined
by Jaggar [1983]). They tend to resist claims founded on purportedly
universal human qualities because such appeals have historically been used
9 It is noteworthy that in her subsequent book only a year later Nussbaum disclaims
commitment to any particular view of the person or human nature (2000, 76). It is not easy
to reconcile the two claims even if she is taken to mean that though the capabilities she
enumerates are derived from human nature, the more comprehensive theory of justice she
avows is not.
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to shield oppressive political practices from scrutiny and to justify patterns
of discrimination that exclude women from educational and social op-
portunities. Feminists who wish to circumvent cultural relativism com-
monly employ other strategies that bypass essentialist commitments.
Though Nussbaum’s version of essentialism may be comparatively benign,
the case for a capabilities approach might be articulated in other ways that
avoid appeals to both human essences and individual-collective dichoto-
mies.10 The case for universal human rights is often launched on grounds
that presuppose no comprehensive theory of human capacities. Ignatieff
builds such a case on human history, taking into account memory of the
horrors unleashed by the Nazis (2001a, 80–81). In an extended response
to ethical relativism, Macklin (1999) distinguishes between values specific
to cultural groups and a class of actions falling under the umbrella of
human rights that pertain to health, well-being, and survival universally.
Macklin declines to delve into deep theoretical questions about the sources
of the latter group, preferring to rely on agreement within the interna-
tional community. Feminist scholars have utilized several overlapping strat-
egies to counter moral relativism. Susan Sherwin (1992) mounts a per-
suasive case for the universal condemnation of all forms of oppression,
and Seyla Benhabib (1999) defends a modified version of Kantian auton-
omy that emphasizes the ability to adopt the standpoint of the other.
Such approaches can accommodate social groups in a nonindividualistic
way. Iris Marion Young (1990) has built a cogent case for conceiving of
groups as not mere aggregates or associations of individuals but as rep-
resenting a distinctive kind of collectivity whose members have a special
affinity with one another based on their similar experience or way of life.
They need not have a complete identity of interests but may hold only
certain interests in common around which their group identity is consti-
tuted and maintained. Insofar as they hold group rights, these would be
limited to their common interests. Individuals would be free to remain
in the group, leave the group, or join another.11 Hence, the advantages
that Nussbaum associates with individualism (women’s freedom from
domination by oppressive families or political regimes) might be achieved
without forgoing the affirmative values of group affiliation. Examples of
10 In response to Nussbaum’s position on this point, see Flax (2001), who takes Nuss-
baum to task for conflating human capabilities with human nature, thereby relegating power
relations to the background.
11 I am not persuaded that this is always possible. In an article extrapolating from quan-
daries in genetic decision making (Donchin 2000), I argue that family members may break
off contact with kin, but terminating the residue of psychological and biological connection
may be far more difficult.
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groups that meet these criteria vary widely and include the kinds of tra-
ditional groups recognized in the third generation of human rights enu-
merated by the United Nations as well as resistance groups including the
Madres de Plaza de Mayo in Argentina and the women’s networks in
Nigeria that I discuss below. In this manner a development theory could
accommodate groups as collectivities without jeopardizing the basic rights
of individuals or privileging protections afforded to one group over those
of others.
Even liberal scholars such as Rawls (1999) view human rights within
the context of associations that are necessary if individuals are to enter
into schemes of social cooperation. But Nussbaum’s theory bypasses even
this intermediate level of affiliation. Her omission is surprising, considering
that the World Health Organization’s definition of health and subsequent
documents based on it all extend the conception of health promotion to
groups as well as individuals (Mann et al. 1999, 8). Moreover, many rights
proclaimed by the United Nations, including the right to development,
entitle people to goods that are only accessible through participation in
a particular community or group. Other rights specific to groups include
nationality, civil association, political participation, union affiliation, and
cultural life as a group member. David Ingram points out that the freedom
of religion, freedom to work, and freedom from insecurity and ignorance
are also rights that individuals are unlikely to exercise apart from group
participation (2000, 242–43). Like some feminist scholars cited above,
he holds that all rights are inherently relational since they presuppose
social guarantees and other positive enabling conditions (247).
Nussbaum’s rejection of collective means is particularly puzzling in light
of her remarks about people’s identification with community values that
they have not deliberately chosen and her passing references to groups of
powerful people (1999, 70). Moreover, development scholar Martha
Chen (1995) associates Nussbaum’s approach with her own work among
indigenous private development agencies in Bangladesh that have broken
with local tradition, which forbids women to work outside the home. These
agencies enter into participatory dialogue with local communities in order
to promote the gainful employment of those who have been denied the
economic security that tradition is supposed to offer. Chen explicitly iden-
tifies these strategies with Nussbaum’s approach (Chen 1995, 40), but there
is no place to fit such groups into Nussbaum’s framework.
The universal-individual polarities imbedded in Nussbaum’s theory ob-
scure both the patterns of group discrimination that impinge on individ-
uals’ abilities to fulfill their capabilities and the seeds of empowerment
that group affiliation can provide. Feminist accounts depart conspicuously
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from Nussbaum’s perspective in their recognition that individuality is in-
evitably situated within particular configurations of power relations and
social connections that provide nurturing, care, and identity (Donchin
2000). People are dependent on their social milieu not only to satisfy
their most basic physical needs but also to guarantee their self-affirmation
and dignity (Freedman 1999, 237). Failure to take systematic account of
the social, political, and relational matrices on which identity is produced
and maintained seriously weakens any program aimed at implementing a
conception of justice that dislodges traditional gender and class hierar-
chies. Struggles to alter conditions under which women live on any part
of the globe are bound to misfire if they disregard local group arrange-
ments, for local people are uniquely situated to anticipate dislocations in
adjacent areas of life resulting from social change and to mobilize responses
to them. And they can draw on their own indigenous networks to resist
dominant norms. Without the collaboration provided by cohesive groups,
marginalized and impoverished individuals are unlikely to gain the wide-
spread social support and resources needed to develop their capabilities
and become agents of personal and social change.
The kinds of problems that arise when local perspectives are disregarded
have been dealt with at length in the controversy that erupted over the
film Warrior Marks (1993), which was produced by Alice Walker, and her
related novel Possessing the Secret of Joy (1993). This debate aptly illustrates
problems that arise when Western activists bypass indigenous local groups.
Walker’s campaign to rally support condemning the practices of African
communities that participate in ritual cutting of young girls’ genitals was
much criticized by African women as still another manifestation of Western
imperialism. Critics charged that her film portrays the African continent
as a monolith and uses female genital mutilation as a gauge by which to
measure moral distance between the West and the rest of humanity.
These critics insisted that the struggle to transform such traditional
practices is better left to those who are sensitive to the social conditions
that perpetuate them and who can foster change in ways less likely to
intensify the oppression of these women. A New York Times op-ed piece
by Seble Dawit and Salem Mekuria (1993, A27) put it this way: “Genital
mutilation does not exist in a vacuum but as part of a social fabric, stem-
ming from the power imbalances in relations between the sexes, from the
levels of education and the low economic and social status of most women.
All eradication efforts must begin and proceed from these basic premises.”
They urge the formation of partnerships with African women; such part-
nerships would use the power and resources of the West to create space
for these women to speak out and to speak with us.
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Through such dialogue policies might be developed to change the ways
that such women are socially perceived, both by themselves and by others
(Valde´s 1995, 428). Crucial to such an undertaking would be encouraging
the capacity to reflect critically on the patriarchal status quo (Li 1995,
409). Of course, critical reflection would be pointless without the power
to implement alternative courses of action.12 From this vantage point an
even stronger case can be made for indigenous programs aimed at ad-
vancing gender equality by expanding opportunities at both individual
and group levels, empowering the development of critical reflection skills,
and fostering local alliances to create alternative group practices within
communities.13
Several further considerations also favor a development theory that
incorporates an intermediate level of social affiliation. First, to achieve a
more just redistribution of resources it is necessary to demonstrate in-
equalities within the prevailing distribution. Unless individuals are envis-
aged within a sociopolitical context, disparities among resources available
to them are likely to appear as mere aberrations, not the result of systemic
neglect. Only by noting group imbalances is it possible for policy analysts
to realize the full implications of maldistribution and to bring to light the
assumptions that have brought it about. Moreover, as Uma Narayan points
out (1997, 11), without collaborative reflection among similarly situated
women, individuals are unlikely to recognize that their own deprivations
are part of a pattern of cultural norms that reflect their position within
the social structure. Narayan speaks of her own mother in India, who
frequently complained about the oppressive conditions that bound her
but was unable to see that her oppression did not stem primarily from
the behavior of particular individuals, such as the mother-in-law who mal-
treated her, but from the social structure that assigned mothers-in-law to
positions of such authority.
Second, traditional relationships and dislocations within a local culture
can often be mobilized to tap human potential. Despite resistance from
entrenched bureaucrats, indigenous groups have built partnerships for
change. In many areas of the globe the traditional work done by women
and the power these responsibilities confer on them can serve as powerful
catalysts for social change and empowerment. Narayan, like many feminists
working in development studies, recognizes that cultures are seldom mon-
olithic but incorporate within themselves a diversity of norms and values
that may not be mutually compatible. Salles, generalizing from her own
12 This position has been developed particularly forcefully by Benhabib (1999).
13 On this point see Sherwin’s cogent discussion (1992, 61–62).
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Latin American experience, points out that “the cultural identity of a
community is always in a state of evolution or transformation” (Salles
2002, 18). I referred above to Chen who stresses the evolving character
of rural South Asian cultures as they respond to internal (often local)
tensions and instabilities that compel women to end their traditional se-
clusion and seek employment outside the home. Margarita Valde´s (1995)
makes an analogous point from the perspective of Mexican culture. She
extends to developing economies Susan Moller Okin’s (1995) observation
about developed countries: employment makes women less dependent on
men and improves their status within the family, thereby strengthening
their bargaining position in relation to men. Furthermore, Valde´s points
out, having a job breaks the social isolation of women who had been
bound to the domestic sphere, thereby enabling them to function in
different social spheres and take action to improve their living conditions.
She notes that in the large Mexican cities many poor women workers have
organized themselves to demand urban reforms and contest the division
of work according to gender (1995, 430). Examples such as these show
that indigenous women’s groups can often intervene at the intersection
of local tradition and social instability to direct social change along paths
that only they can identify as most likely to improve their living conditions.
Works by Obioma Nnaemeka (1996, 1997) and Nkiru Nzegwu (1995)
illustrate the numerous practices of cooperative reform and resistance prac-
ticed by African women, particularly among grassroots networks of affil-
iated women’s groups that constitute the backbone of local development.
Nnaemeka shows how the structures of indigenous culture guarantee and
maintain the existence of these networks, and she points out how some
of the most successful development programs in these countries are “con-
ceived, designed and executed by the national or local government or-
ganizations” (1996, 274).
Nzegwu (1995) chronicles the economic and social power that women
held in Igbo culture prior to colonial rule. Indigenous cultural traditions
valued female assertiveness and collectivity. Women utilized their networking
skills to mobilize across cultural, religious, and economic boundaries, ef-
fectively resisting male encroachment on their independence. But after co-
lonial powers imposed their own scheme of gender-specific values on Igbo
society, women were reclassified as dependents, a status that precipitated
the 1929 Women’s War disclaiming their invisibility. Nzegwu’s account
vividly portrays the effects of the sexist system imported by the British
colonizers and shows how co-optation of African men into Western gender
stereotyping damaged Nigerian political culture. Today development pro-
jects are still targeted at men, and wide disparities in the incomes of men
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and women persist. Nzegwu urges developers to consider the diverse
character traits of groups of women and to be responsive to alternative
models of experience and organizational skills. But it is not only developers
who have hindered Nigerian development. Granddaughters of the women
who fought the Women’s War have taken on a wealthy multinational oil
company that has drained their country’s natural resources and contrib-
uted nothing to local development. They are now demanding that this
company employ more local people, invest in infrastructure projects, and
assist villagers to supply food to the company’s employees. Their strategies
draw on the tradition of market trading by women and modes of protest
deeply rooted in their indigenous culture (Peel 2002).
By such means African women have been challenging both multina-
tional companies and technically oriented development projects that have
irresponsibly imposed changes depriving local economies of resources
needed to meet subsistence needs. They question the effectiveness of large-
scale centralized programs and recommend that development assistance
be adapted to local institutional structures and cultural environments. And
they insist that companies that drain local resources share their profits
with the local economy. They draw on an established tradition of group
cohesiveness concentrated in the intermediary political and cultural spaces
of prevailing networks and historical relationships stretching between the
family and the state.14
Nussbaum’s interpretation of the capabilities model is largely silent
about the tendency of multinational corporations to exploit the resources
of developing economies. Sensitivity to varying cultural contexts and cross-
cultural influences would greatly enhance the case for the universality of
the capabilities approach to human development. Recognition of universal
human capabilities has major implications for the responsibilities of wealth-
ier countries both to less-developed ones and to pockets of poverty, health
care disparities, and gender inequalities in their own economies. Okin
notes that when comparisons are made between the living conditions of
poor women in developed and developing countries, disparities between
economies diminish considerably. She points out that though the severity
of their poverty may be greater in poorer countries, patterns of discrim-
ination in developed countries are very similar, particularly within family
units (Okin 1995, 284). Moreover, though imbalances in access to health
care among economic groups and disparities in maternal-infant morbidity
and mortality may not be as severe in richer countries, their injustice is
14 For the views of other scholars seeking to counter the dominant developmentparadigm,
see contributors to Munck and O’Hearn 1999.
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all the more striking since the resources needed to rectify such imbalances
are readily available. An analogous point can be made about violence
against women. Cass Sunstein cites data showing that women are the
victims of both public and private violence in similar proportions in both
developed and developing countries (1995, 357).
One final point about Nussbaum’s formulation: her insistence on locating
human rights within liberal theory risks undermining pragmatic aspects of
the human rights movement and getting in the way of efforts by interna-
tional bodies to forge consensus around practical goals. Within the bioethics
community it has already been shown that it is far easier to reach common
ground at the level of practice (on the basis of what Sunstein [2001, 49–66]
calls “incompletely theorized agreements”) than moral principle. Anthony
Appiah points out that unlike the U.S. Constitution, the international hu-
man rights framework has an important advantage in that it does not pro-
ceed by deriving human rights from metaphysical first principles (2001,
104). This was a deliberate strategy on the part of those who drafted the
framework, for they were aiming to achieve universal assent. Even among
so-called liberal countries there is widespread disagreement about how to
prioritize theoretical principles. Some question even the desirability of
formulating principle-based frameworks for medical decision making. The
Scandinavian countries, for instance, tend to emphasize social welfare and
patient entitlements, while several others (most notably the United States)
emphasize individual rights (Dickenson 1999). The consensus achieved
in such agreements as the Council of Europe, the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine (1997), the Bioethics Declaration approved by
the World Conference of Bioethics in Gijo´n (2000), and the UNESCO
Document on the Human Genome (1997) was possible only by focusing
on concrete goals and bypassing any single overarching grand theory.
Toward an alternative framework
Considering the range of disagreement, a multipronged pluralistic ap-
proach seems far more likely to contribute to alleviating injustices than a
unified theoretical design. To be effective in countering global economic
and political interests that flout human rights, we must move beyond even
the empathetic identification with the situation of the deprived that fem-
inist theorists have endorsed. Feminists need to forge links with like-
minded groups to thwart power elites intent on bypassing the rights of
oppressed people. Narayan’s mother failed to understand the forces that
victimized her, so she misidentified the source of her oppression. Similarly,
many women who submit to genital cutting see themselves as having no
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effective options within the social context that frames their lives. It is vital
that as people are awakened to their deprivations they be empowered to
develop viable alternative institutions and practices.
There is need, then, to work cooperatively at both theoretical and
practical levels to challenge the dominant economic development para-
digm and to foster a more nuanced and fully integrated conceptual ap-
paratus that combines human rights discourse with a flexibly constructed
capabilities model that is responsive to changing conditions in local cul-
tures. In some cultural contexts, such as African communities where a
tradition of local women’s groups persists, local knowledges and affilia-
tions should be reinvigorated. In others (e.g., Mexico) where traditional
male privileges have blocked the formation of women’s alliances, new
relational networks need to be encouraged to advance women’s interests.
To be of practical use, this alternative paradigm should recognize both
traditional and innovative local alliances, thereby contributing to struc-
tures that enhance women’s agency and well-being both individually and
collectively. As has been shown with HIV/AIDS medical therapy and
prevention work in the Asia-Pacific region, individual empowerment is
inextricably interwoven with the well-being of communities. Only if hu-
man rights are protected at the local level can individuals be empowered
to make the fully informed choices that create a climate for dealing ef-
fectively with disease prevention and intertwined conditions that perpet-
uate discrimination and block reconstruction of the cultural fabric of once-
marginalized communities (Bagasao 1998).
Vital, too, is support for the expanded definition of health advocated
by the human rights supporters and alliances with women working in the
movement to strengthen overlapping agendas. With a few notable excep-
tions, infrastructure development has a far greater impact on health than
specific medical interventions. And the net needs to be cast still wider.
For the promotion of women’s health in particular depends on the in-
teraction of many human rights—including rights to employment, edu-
cation, information, political participation, influence, and democratic
power within legislatures (Shinn 1999). To call attention to the multi-
plicity of factors affecting health, we need to mobilize across divides of
race and ethnicity to advance debate and build coalitions to pressure for
the implementation of the full complement of human rights.
Feminist bioethicists can contribute to this program by integrating into
our perspectives relevant features of both human rights discourse and a
capabilities approach to development. We need to restructure our frame-
work to supplant the dominant individualistic bias with the recognition
that individual identity is constituted and maintained through relational
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networks. To this end, I propose adopting and implementing the strategy
Sherwin (2001) has put forward for the future development of bioethics.
Instead of aiming at any single grand theory, we should reconceive moral
theories as multiple perspectives that provide partial and overlapping re-
sources to address difficult moral issues. Within such a reconception, fem-
inist bioethics, development theory, and human rights discourse would offer
overlapping and interlocking “lenses” to illumine dimensions of moral prob-
lems obscured by accounts that are structured by a single overarching the-
oretical matrix.
Such a reworked moral framework offers the best promise for revealing
structural injustices that are masked by prevailing approaches; reshaping
social conditions to promote the autonomy, health, and well-being of
subjugated peoples across diverse cultures and traditions; and removing
barriers that impede women’s full participation in both local and global
networks. Feminists working in both bioethics and development theory
can play an important role in this enterprise by linking their conceptual
frameworks in a manner that preserves the universal dimension of human
rights without neglecting the distinctive contributions local groups can
make to overcoming oppressive conditions. On a practical level, alliances
should also be forged with human rights groups that are challenging
dominant development paradigms, which advance the interests of elites
at the expense of marginalized individuals and groups. Such integration
would benefit both development theory and feminist bioethics. Hopefully,
by this means feminists can forge a truly global feminist framework.
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